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Highly Uncertain Times: An Analysis
of the Executive Branch's Decision
To Not Investigate or Prosecute
Individuals in Compliance with
State Medical Marijuana Laws
by VIJAY SEKHON*
Introduction
Fourteen of the fifty states in the United States and the District
of Columbia have enacted legislation legalizing the possession,
cultivation, and use of marijuana for the treatment of certain
illnesses However, the possession, cultivation, and use of marijuana
is illegal under federal law,2 carrying maximum prison sentences
ranging from one year to life in prison and maximum fines ranging
from one thousand to eight million dollars (depending upon the
* Staff Attorney in the Office of the General Counsel of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Juris Doctorate from Stanford Law School and member of the
State Bars of California and New York. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by
any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the staff
of the Commission. The author would like to dedicate this article to his late father-in-law,
Arun Pereira, whose use of medical marijuana during his struggle with non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma served as the inspiration for this article.
1. These states include Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and
Vermont. The Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, Active State Medical
Marijuana Programs, http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?GroupID=3391 (last visited Feb.
6, 2010). Maryland has decriminalized the possession of less than one ounce of marijuana
by individuals who can demonstrate, as an affirmative defense, that their use of marijuana
is out of medical necessity. Id.
2. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2009).
[553]
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amount of marijuana at issue and the circumstances underlying the
conviction).3
On June 6, 2005, the United States Supreme Court held in
Gonzales v. Raich that federal laws criminalizing the possession,
cultivation, and use of marijuana by intrastate growers and users of
marijuana for medical purposes were constitutional under the
Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution." Gonzales v. Raich
made it clear that individuals who possessed, cultivated, and used
marijuana in compliance with state medical marijuana laws did so at
the risk of prosecution by federal law enforcement officials for
violation of federal law. Emboldened by the Court's decision in
Gonzales, the Executive Branch under President George W. Bush
increased its investigation and prosecution of medical marijuana
patients, cultivators, and dispensaries from late 2005 through early
2009.!
On March 18, 2009, however, United States Attorney General
Eric Holder stated that
the [Executive Branch's] policy is to go after those people
who violate both federal and state law. To the extent that
people do that and try to use medical marijuana laws as a
shield for activity that is not designed to comport with what
the intention was of the state law, those are the organizations,
the people, that we will target.6
Following this shift in enforcement policy regarding medical
marijuana by the Executive Branch under President Barack Obama,
the number of medical marijuana patients and dispensaries began to
dramatically increase in the states that had enacted legislation
legalizing the possession, cultivation, and use of marijuana for the
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 844(a) (2009).
4. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
5. Americans for Safe Access, Federal Cases, http://www.safeaccessnow.org/article.
php?list=type&type=184 (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
6. Josh Meyer & Scott Glover, Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Will no Longer be
Prosecuted, U.S. Attorney General Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, available at
http://articles.Iatimes.com/2009/mar/19/local/me-medpotl9; see also Devlin Barrett,
Attorney General Signals Shift in Marijuana Policy, Mar. 18, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/wireStory?id=7114447; David W. Ogden, Investigations and Prosecutions in States
Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana, Oct. 19, 2009, available at http://www.justice.
gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf.
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treatment of certain illnesses.7 A survey of medical marijuana
dispensaries in these states concluded that requests for medical
marijuana increased between 50% and 300% since President Obama
took office on January 20, 2009.'
Section I of this Comment analyzes the constitutionality of the
Executive Branch's decision to not investigate or prosecute
individuals in compliance with state medical marijuana laws. As
detailed in Section I, the change in the Executive Branch's
enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana is a questionable use
of prosecutorial discretion given the separation of powers in the
Federal Constitution and the United States Supreme Court's holdings
in United States v. Batchelder and Wayte v. United States. Section II of
this Comment analyzes the impact of the Executive Branch's decision
to not investigate or prosecute individuals in compliance with state
medical marijuana laws. As detailed in Section II, the Executive
Branch's revised enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana
provides individuals with a false sense of security in relying upon
compliance with state medical marijuana laws given the imprimatur of
the Executive Branch, the possibility of a legal challenge to the
Executive Branch's revised enforcement policy regarding medical
marijuana, and the length of the statute of limitations with respect to
violations of the federal laws prohibiting the possession, cultivation
and use of marijuana. In conclusion, I urge Congress to pass, and
President Obama to sign into law, legislation consistent with the
Executive Branch's revised enforcement policy regarding medical
marijuana in order to ensure the constitutionality of such
enforcement policy. In the meantime, I urge states that have enacted
medical marijuana laws to highlight the risks of relying upon
compliance with such laws despite the change in the Executive
Branch's enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana.
7. Brian Alexander, Medical Marijuana Requests Climb Sky High, Apr. 15, 2009,
http://rss.msnbc.msn.com/id/30217044/. President Obama had previously indicated during
his campaign for presidency that he did not support the use of federal resources to
circumvent state medical marijuana laws. Stephen Dinan & Ben Conery, DEA Pot Raids
Go on; Obama Opposes, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://www.washington
times.com/news/2009/feb/05/dea-led-by-bush-continues-pot-raids/.
8. Alexander, supra note 7.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
I. The Constitutionality of the Executive Branch's Decision
To Not Investigate or Prosecute Individuals in Compliance with
State Medical Marijuana Laws
Under the Federal Constitution, Congress has the power to
regulate interstate commerce and make all laws that are necessary
and proper for the execution of Congress' powers.9 Congress
expressly relied upon its power to regulate interstate commerce in
1970 when it enacted the Controlled Substances Act, the statute
criminalizing the possession, cultivation, and use of marijuana and
other substances under federal law. ° On the other hand, the Federal
Constitution stipulates that the Executive Branch is responsible for
executing the laws of the United States." Congress has also
specifically directed each United States attorney to prosecute all
offenses against the United States (including violations of the
Controlled Substances Act) within his or her district.
Due to the scarcity of the Executive Branch's resources,
however, federal regulators cannot investigate and prosecute every
detected federal crime. The Executive Branch must exercise
discretion in selecting which alleged violations of federal law to
investigate and prosecute, and which alleged violations of federal law
to ignore due to scarcity of resources.'3 On June 4, 1979, the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Batchelder affirmed the
broad prosecutorial discretion of the Executive Branch, holding that
"[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's
discretion."' 4 However, the Court in Batchelder also held that the use
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18 (stating that Congress has the power to "regulate
commerce ... among the several states" and "make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers"); see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (holding that "necessary" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the
Federal Constitution should be read broadly to include all means which are appropriate in
order for Congress to implement its constitutionally established powers); see also Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that activity which "exerts a substantial
economic effect" on interstate commerce can be regulated by Congress pursuant to
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Federal Constitution).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2009).
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President "shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed").
12. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2009).
13. Michael E. O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don't: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 231 (2003).
14. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979).
[Vol. 37:3
Spring 2010] FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA 557
of prosecutorial discretion by the Executive Branch is not
"unfettered" and is subject to "constitutional constraints."15
Furthermore, on March 19, 1985, the Court in Wayte v. United
States expanded upon the rationale underlying the broad
prosecutorial discretion of the Executive Branch, noting that:
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the
decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.
Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's
general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement
priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's
overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind
of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial
supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of
particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays
the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by
subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to
outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness
by revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All these
are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant
to examine the decision whether to prosecute.
Given the separation of powers in the Federal Constitution and
the Court's holdings in Batchelder and Wayte, the Executive Branch's
decision to not investigate or prosecute individuals in compliance
with state medical marijuana laws is a questionable use of
prosecutorial discretion. The Executive Branch's revised
enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana is in clear
contravention with the Controlled Substances Act, under which
Congress criminalized the possession, cultivation and use of
marijuana under federal law without any exception for individuals in
compliance with state medical marijuana laws. 7  Congress has
repeatedly considered but failed to pass legislation that would permit
the possession, cultivation and use of marijuana by individuals in
compliance with state medical marijuana laws under the Controlled
Substances Act. 8  More importantly, Congress has repeatedly
rejected amendments to appropriations bills that would prohibit the
15. Id. at 124-25.
16. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985).
17. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)-(b), 844(a) (2009).
18. See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2233,
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.
912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997).
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use of appropriated funds to the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency and the United States Department of Justice to prevent states
from implementing laws that authorize the possession, cultivation and
use of marijuana for medical purposes.19 Consequently, the Executive
Branch's decision to not investigate or prosecute individuals in
compliance with state medical marijuana laws is a clear subversion of
the legislative process that can only be justified as a valid use of
prosecutorial discretion by the Executive Branch.2°
Although the Court's analysis in Batchelder was focused on an
alleged violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Federal Constitution by the Executive Branch through its use of
prosecutorial discretion, the Court left open the possibility of other
"constitutional constraints" on the prosecutorial discretion of the
Executive Branch.21 The separation of powers in the Federal
Constitution, which grants Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce and make all laws that are necessary and proper for the
execution of Congress' powers and makes the Executive Branch
responsible for executing the laws of the United States,22 has a strong
likelihood of being one of the additional "constitutional constraints"
on the prosecutorial discretion of the Executive Branch. If presented
with the question regarding the constitutionality of the Executive
Branch's decision to not investigate or prosecute individuals in
compliance with state medical marijuana laws, there is a strong
likelihood that a federal court would call into question the Executive
Branch's use of prosecutorial discretion to bypass the legislative
process and enact enforcement policy consistent with legislation that
had been proposed but rejected by Congress.
19. See H. AMDT. 674 (amending H.R. 3093), 110th Cong. (2007); H.AMDT. 1144
(amending H.R. 5672), 109th Cong. (2006); H.AMDT. 272 (amending H.R. 2862), 109th
Cong. (2005); H.AMDT. 646 (amending H.R. 4754), 109th Cong. (2004); H.AMDT. 297
(amending H.R. 2799), 108th Cong. (2003).
20. The Deputy Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice sent a
memorandum to selected United States attorneys on October 19, 2009, acknowledging the
Executive Branch's reliance on prosecutorial discretion to justify the constitutionality of
the Executive Branch's decision to not investigate or prosecute individuals in compliance
with state medical marijuana laws. Ogden, supra note 6, at 2; see also Barrett, supra note 6
("Given the limited resources that we have, our focus will be on people, organizations that
are growing, cultivating substantial amounts of marijuana and doing so in a way that's
inconsistent with federal and state law.").
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; McCulloch, 17 U.S.
316, 421 (1819); Wickard, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
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Moreover, the concerns of judicial review with of the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion by the Executive Branch raised by the Court
in Wayte generally do not apply with respect to judicial review of the
change in the Executive Branch's enforcement policy regarding
medical marijuana. First, judicial review of the Executive Branch's
decision to not investigate or prosecute individuals in compliance
with state medical marijuana laws would not undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness by revealing the Executive Branch's enforcement policy,
delay any enforcement proceeding, or chill law enforcement because
the Executive Branch has publicly announced its enforcement policy
regarding medical marijuana.' Second, the concerns of the Court in
Wayte regarding judicial review of the strength of a particular case, a
particular case's relationship to the Executive Branch's enforcement
plan or the general deterrence value of the prosecution of a particular
case would not be applicable to judicial review of the Executive
Branch's decision to not investigate or prosecute individuals in
compliance with state medical marijuana laws, as such a review (as
outlined in Section II below) would relate to the Executive Branch's
general enforcement plan regarding medical marijuana rather than
the prosecution of a particular case. Finally, although the Executive
Branch's enforcement priorities are generally not susceptible to
judicial review, the failure of the Executive Branch to investigate or
prosecute medical marijuana dispensaries operating openly in major
metropolitan areas with publicly available websites (and consequently
minimal investigation and prosecution costs) would likely be
questioned by a federal court.
Consequently, given the separation of powers in the Federal
Constitution and the United States Supreme Court's holdings in
Batchelder and Wayte, the Executive Branch's decision to not
investigate or prosecute individuals in compliance with state medical
marijuana laws is a questionable use of prosecutorial discretion.
II. The Impact of the Executive Branch's Decision To Not
Investigate or Prosecute Individuals in Compliance with State
Medical Marijuana Laws
As indicated in the Introduction to this Comment, the number of
medical marijuana patients and dispensaries in the states that have
enacted legislation legalizing the possession, cultivation, and use of
marijuana for the treatment of certain illnesses has dramatically
23. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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increased following the change in the Executive Branch's
enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana.24 This increase is
directly attributable to the imprimatur of the Executive Branch with
respect to medical marijuana. Medical marijuana patients and
dispensaries are now comfortable possessing, cultivating, and using
marijuana in compliance with state medical marijuana laws without
fear of federal investigation or prosecution.
The imprimatur of the Executive Branch with respect to medical
marijuana provides individuals with a false sense of security in relying
upon compliance with state medical marijuana laws given the
possibility of a legal challenge to the change in the Executive
Branch's enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana. On
December 4, 1882, the United States Supreme Court in United States
v. Lee established the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which
generally prohibits lawsuits against the federal government by private
citizens unless Congress has consented to such lawsuit.25 Because of
such immunity, private citizens do not have standing to sue the
Executive Branch for failure to enforce the Controlled Substances
Act with respect to individuals in compliance with state medical
marijuana laws.26
Members of Congress, however, may have standing to sue the
Executive Branch for failure to enforce the Controlled Substances
Act with respect to individuals in compliance with state medical
marijuana laws under the doctrine of legislative standing. On June 5,
1939, the United States Supreme Court in Coleman v. Miller held that
Kansas state senators had standing to challenge the passage of the
Child Labor Amendment in the Kansas Senate pursuant to Article V
of the Federal Constitution where the Kansas Lieutenant Governor,
as the then-presiding officer of the Kansas Senate, cast the deciding
vote in favor of the Amendment.27 The rationale of the Court in
Coleman for granting standing to the Kansas senators was that the
24. See supra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text.
25. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206-07 (1882).
26. Although Congress consented to certain lawsuits against the federal government
in 1948 when it enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act, such lawsuits are limited to
"circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2009). Because a private person cannot be held liable for failure to
enforce federal law, the Federal Tort Claims Act would not permit a lawsuit by a private
citizen against the Executive Branch for failure to enforce the Controlled Substances Act
with respect to individuals in compliance with state medical marijuana laws.
27. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,450 (1939).
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senators "have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining
the effectiveness of their votes" with respect to amendments to the
Federal Constitution."' Nevertheless, on June 26, 1997, the Court in
Raines v. Byrd held that members of Congress did not have standing
to challenge the Line Item Veto Act that was passed by Congress and
signed into law by then President William Clinton.29 The Court's
rationale in Raines for refusing to grant standing to the members of
Congress was that the members "have not alleged that they voted for
a specific bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that
the bill was nonetheless deemed defeated. In the vote on the Act,
their votes were given full effect; they simply lost that vote.,
30
Under the doctrine of legislative standing established by the
United States Supreme Court in Coleman and revisited in Raines, any
United States Congressman who voted for appropriations bills that
appropriated funds to the United States Drug Enforcement Agency
and the United States Department of Justice for the enforcement of
the Controlled Substances Act would have a strong likelihood of
obtaining standing with respect to a challenge to the Executive
Branch's decision to not investigate or prosecute individuals in
compliance with state medical marijuana laws. Such Congressmen
would be able to demonstrate, as required by the Court in Coleman,
that the effectiveness of their votes on such appropriations bills has
been nullified by the Executive Branch's decision to enact
enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana in direct
contravention to such bills and in accordance with amendments to
such bills that had been proposed but rejected by Congress. Unlike
the Congressmen in Raines, here Congressmen can directly point to
the specific appropriations bills that they voted for and were passed,
but nonetheless were nullified by the change in the Executive
Branch's enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana.
In addition, despite the current enforcement policy of the
Executive Branch with respect to medical marijuana, it should be
noted that violations of the Controlled Substances Act are subject to
a five-year statute of limitations.31 The imprimatur of the Executive
Branch with respect to medical marijuana also provides individuals
with a false sense of security in relying upon compliance with state
28. Id. at 438.
29. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,813-14 (1997).
30. Id. at 824.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2009).
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medical marijuana laws given the possibility of a change to such
enforcement policy by the Executive Branch during or after the
expiration of the term of President Obama.
Finally, it should be noted that defendants to any future federal
prosecution regarding the possession, cultivation, and use of
marijuana in compliance with state medical marijuana laws will likely
be unable to claim ignorance of the law as a defense, as the Court has
repeatedly held that such a defense in untenable in federal court.32
Conclusion
This Comment illustrates that the Executive Branch's decision to
not investigate or prosecute individuals in compliance with state
medical marijuana laws is a questionable use of prosecutorial
discretion and provides individuals with a false sense of security in
relying upon compliance with such laws given the imprimatur of the
Executive Branch, the possibility of a legal challenge to the Executive
Branch's revised enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana,
and the length of the statute of limitations with respect to violations
of the Controlled Substances Act.
In order to ensure the constitutionality of the Executive Branch's
decision to not investigate or prosecute individuals in compliance
with state medical marijuana laws, Congress should pass, and
President Obama should sign into law, legislation consistent with the
Executive Branch's revised enforcement policy regarding medical
marijuana. Such legislation should preferably permit the possession,
cultivation, and use of marijuana by individuals in compliance with
state medical marijuana laws under the Controlled Substances Act,
but at the very least amend appropriations bills to prohibit the use of
appropriated funds to the United States Drug Enforcement Agency
and the United States Department of Justice to prevent states from
implementing laws that authorize the possession, cultivation, and use
of marijuana for medical purposes.33
Until such legislation is signed into law, states that have enacted
medical marijuana laws should warn medical marijuana patients that
the Executive Branch's decision to not investigate or prosecute
individuals in compliance with state medical marijuana laws is subject
32. See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563
(1971); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991).
33. Similar legislation has been previously considered by Congress. See supra notes
18 and 19 and accompanying text.
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to legal challenge and could change at any time, and that violations of
the Controlled Substances Act are subject to a five-year statute of
limitations. In order to maximize the utility of such warnings, medical
marijuana dispensaries should be required by states to post a clear
description of such warnings in a readily visible manner. Such
warnings will help to ensure that individuals in compliance with state
medical marijuana laws are aware of the possibility of federal
prosecution despite the Executive Branch's revised enforcement
policy regarding medical marijuana.
564 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 37:3
